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Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 
2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) 
By 
Dunia P. Zongwe1 
 
Readers of the judgment in Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank will be taken aback 
by evidence that the South African intelligence services got involved in efforts to change the 
core mandate of the country’s central bank. This involvement of the state’s security arm, 
together with the country’s ombudsman (i.e., the Public Protector), brings up several questions. 
What connects central banking to national security? What did the Public Protector mean by the 
central bank’s “vulnerability”, a concept that she used to justify her investigation into the 
central bank and her meetings with the President and the intelligence services?2 If the Public 
Protector had misgivings about the central bank’s mandate, why not simply suggest to the 
national executive to initiate legislation to amend the relevant provisions in the Constitution 
and the South African Reserve Bank Act? Perhaps, most disturbingly during litigation, why 
did the Public Protector lie under oath?3 
 
This case has created a great puzzle difficult to piece together. Even the judges of the 
Constitutional Court who decided this case split 8-2 on this issue. Chief Justice Mogoeng and 
Goliath AJ saw nothing sinister or inappropriate in the Public Protector meeting with the 
national intelligence agency, known as the State Security Agency, since that agency virtually 
initiated the investigation that eventually landed in the Constitutional Court.4 They also 
rejected the High Court judge’s description of those meetings as ‘secretive’ since the Public 
Protector voluntarily waived the classification of the record of her discussion with the State 
Security Agency.5 
 
However, the majority of the bench, represented by Khampepe J and Theron J, did not agree 
with the Chief Justice on this score. They claimed that, despite the general practice within the 
Public Protector’s office of producing transcripts of all meetings conducted during an 
                                                             
1 Associate Professor, Department of Legal Studies, Walter Sisulu University. J.S.D. (Cornell); LL.M. (Cornell); 
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2 See Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) [67]. 
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investigation, the Public Protector did not furnish any transcripts of her meetings with the 
Presidency and the State Security Agency,6 and failed to explain timeously and intelligibly 
why she discussed SARB’s vulnerability with them.7 
 
Even if these events unfolded in the background of the case, they nonetheless rekindle the 
debate about how independently from the state should a central bank operate. And, although 
the Chief Justice saw nothing sinister or cynical about the involvement of the intelligence 
services, this presence – far from being a sideshow – gives a new twist to governments’ 
misgivings about central-bank orthodoxy in developing countries. 
 
The facts 
In this case, the Constitutional Court of South Africa primarily dealt with cost orders issued 
against the Public Protector. It also dwelt on a secondary problem yet worthy enough for 
society and the economy to warrant greater attention: the independence of the central bank. 
In Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank (hereinafter referred to as ‘PP v SARB’), the 
Constitutional Court had to determine whether the Public Protector conformed to the 
Constitution in the way she handled a matter involving a loan granted by the central bank. 
Between 1986 and 1995, the country’s central bank, known as the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB), lent to Bankorp an amount of 3.2 billion Rand. Bankorp appeared financially 
destitute. In 1992, a commercial bank, Absa, acquired Bankorp. SARB extended its Bankorp 
loan to Absa “as a consideration” for the acquisition of Bankorp. 
 
As it turned out, however, and contrary to the terms of its agreement with SARB, Bankorp 
never paid back that loan. Later in 1997, the South African government – represented by the 
director of its national intelligence agency – hired CIEX, an entity based in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and specializing in recovering assets. CIEX investigated the loan and reported 
that corruption, fraud, and maladministration marred that lending to Bankorp/Absa. 
 
CIEX also found that the government could recover the loan from Absa. Between 1998 and 
2000, both the government and SARB mandated certain persons to investigate how the 
government could recover those ill-gotten gains by Bankorp/Absa. However, these efforts did 
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not bear fruit. In 2010, a representative of a non-governmental organization formally 
complained to the Public Protector about the alleged failure by the government to recover the 
Bankorp/Absa loan. 
 
Following the complaint, the then Public Protector, Ms Thuli Madonsela, launched an 
investigation into the Bankorp/Absa matter and consulted with several parties, including Absa 
and SARB. Seven years later, while the investigation was still pending, Ms Busisiwe 
Mkwebane succeeded Madonsela as Public Protector. The new Public Protector issued the pre-
existing provisional report and consulted with Absa and SARB once again. 
 
Interestingly, Ms Mkwebane went on to consult with the Presidency, the national intelligence 
agency (known as the State Security Agency), and the minister responsible for that agency. She 
also consulted with an economist and Black First Land First, a Black consciousness, pan-
Africanist and revolutionary socialist political movement. SARB lamented that these 
consultations showed that the new Public Protector failed to investigate the matter fairly and 
in an unbiased fashion. In the final report that she published, Ms Mkhwebane made 
recommendations that differed from those put forth in the provisional report drafted by her 
predecessor. 
 
Specifically, the Public Protector’s final report recommended, among others, that: 
• SARB fully cooperate with investigating authorities in the recovery of misappropriated 
public funds; and 
• Parliament initiate “a process that will result in the amendment of s224 of the 
Constitution, in pursuit of improving socio-economic conditions of the citizens”. 
 
The court battle 
In 2018, SARB asked the North Gauteng High Court to review the Public Protector’s final 
report. The court reviewed the report and the amendment to the Constitution that the report 
recommended.8 The Court observed that, with her report, Public Protector Busisiwe 
Mkhwebane aimed to “amend the Constitution to deprive the Reserve Bank of its independent 
power to protect the value of the currency.”9 SARB asked the court for punitive costs against 
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the Public Protector in her personal capacity and it prayed the court for a declaration that she 
abused her office. 
 
The High Court set aside the Public Protector’s recommendations almost entirely, but rejected 
SARB’s application for a declaration that the Public Protector abused her office. Nonetheless, 
the court awarded punitive costs against the office of the Public Protector and ordered 15% of 
punitive costs against the Public Protector in her personal capacity.10 
The Public Protector appealed to the Constitutional Court against the High Court’s order that 
she pays punitive costs in her personal capacity. In essence, the Court sought to determine 
whether the High Court relied on the correct principles for awarding costs on an attorney and 
client scale. 
 
The Constitutional Court upheld the High Court’s decision. Moreover, the majority of judges 
did not make any order as to costs, such that the order made the High Court regarding the costs 
stood unchanged after the Constitutional Court’s final ruling in PP v SARB. 
Khampepe J and Theron J, who wrote for the majority, noted the “higher standard of conduct 
expected from public officials” and observed that, in the course of litigation, the Public 
Protector had put forth a number of falsehoods and misstatements.11 They observed that the 
Public Protector’s “entire model of investigation was flawed”:12 
 
She was not honest about her engagement during the investigation. In addition, she failed to engage with 
the parties directly affected by her new remedial action before she published her final report. 
 
Thus, for only the second time in South Africa’s history,13 the court ordered a senior 
constitutional office bearer (i.e., Public Protector Mkhwebane) to pay personal costs while 
litigating on the state’s behalf. 
 
Significance of the judgment 
While the Constitutional Court weighed most heavily on the issue of the cost orders against the 
Public Protector, the real action lay elsewhere. Researchers and the legal profession will likely 
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remember the PP v SARB case much less for its rulings on cost orders than for its foray into 
the independence of a central bank. 
 
This case matters also because it deals with efforts by the Public Protector to change the core 
mandate of the central bank from “protecting the value of the currency” to “promot[ing] 
balanced and sustainable economic growth in the Republic, while ensuring that the socio-
economic well-being of the citizens are protected.”14 However, unlike the question of SARB’s 
core mandate, the independence of the central bank formed part of the Court’s deliberations, 
especially from Chief Justice Mogoeng. 
 
Independence of the central bank 
Like almost every central bank in the world, SARB’s primary mandate is to ensure monetary 
stability. Section 224 of the South African Constitution reads as follows: 
 
(1) The primary object of the South African Reserve Bank is to protect the value of the currency in the 
interest of balanced and sustainable economic growth in the Republic. 
(2) The South African Reserve Bank, in pursuit of its primary object, must perform its functions 
independently and without fear, favour or prejudice, but there must be regular consultation between 
the Bank and the Cabinet member responsible for national financial matters. 
(3)  
The Constitution obliges SARB, when it pursues its primary objective of stabilizing the 
currency, to “perform its functions independently”. Although it qualifies this obligation by 
requiring SARB to consult with the Cabinet member responsible for national financial matters 
(i.e., the Finance Minister), the Constitution expects SARB to fulfil its mandate “without fear, 
favour or prejudice”. In short, the Constitution consecrates the principle of central bank 
independence. 
 
Mogoeng CJ held that SARB must be trusted to perform its functions independently and that 
no reason exists to believe that this “constitutionally-ordained facilitator” of “balanced and 
sustainable economic growth” favours some players in the economy, thus disregarding its 
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mandate, and that it could even as much as consider entering into an unlawful contract at a 
great financial loss, thus prejudicing the interests of the general public.15 
 
He noted, however, that the seriousness of the allegations of corruption, illegality or 
impropriety, especially those relating to an amount exceeding R1 billion, warranted a thorough 
investigation.16 In the process, the Chief Justice took issue with SARB’s behaviour, which he 
denounced as exuding an air of “untouchability”. 
 
Challenging the sacrosanct central bank’s independence 
Mogoeng CJ observed that, unlike Absa, SARB behaved as an untouchable institution and 
sought to intimidate and exact vengeance on the Public Protector for daring to question its 
independence:17 
 
The Reserve Bank comes across so strongly against the Public Protector, unlike Absa, as to give credence 
to a belief that it is a vindictive litigant that seems to yearn for untouchability. It comes across as wanting 
to teach the Public Protector and others an unforgettable lesson. And the message apparently sought to 
be communicated, through that lesson, is “you hold the Reserve Bank accountable like all others or 
subject it to public scrutiny at your peril”. 
 
Mogoeng CJ pushed back against such comportment and reaffirmed that nobody and no 
institution could use the courts to entrench a culture of impunity or untouchability for itself.18 
He warned people against handling SARB so as to exempt it from “scrutiny and accountability 
regardless of what it might have done – under the ever-lurking subtle threat of potential harm 
to the economy or the displeasure of market forces.”19 
 
Mogoeng CJ noted that “[n]othing sinister or anything that smacks of lack of impartiality or 
independence ought to flow so effortlessl” from the Public Protector’s meeting with the 
President.20 He reminded the parties of section 85(2)(d) of the Constitution,21 which vests in 
the executive, headed by the President, the authority to prepare and initiate any legislation, 
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including a constitutional amendment. The Chief Justice therefore dismissed as incorrect 
SARB’s argument that the Presidency would have no role to play in a possible amendment of 
the Constitution intended to modify the SARB’s mandate and that the entire process falls under 
the exclusive domain of the legislature.22 
 
This perspective on the place of the central bank within the new constitutional order accords 
with Keynesian economic theory. Keynesian policymakers propose that the law subjects the 
central bank to some measure of democratic control by the government. Keynesians think that, 
taking monetary policy away from politicians by brandishing the doctrine of central-bank 
independence (CBI), can conflict with fundamental democratic values.23 
 
Mogoeng CJ underlined that, precisely because of its critical role in securing the wellbeing of 
the economy, SARB must remain transparent and clean.24 He added that, though the Public 
Protector’s investigation into the Bankorp/Absa matter could “scratch [SARB’s] institutional 
ego the wrong way”, the “overwhelming public interest” for it to clear its name in this 
investigation and preserve public confidence or the confidence of reasonable market forces 
should impel SARB to welcome and make the most of the opportunity.25 
 
Mogoeng CJ concluded by rejecting SARB’s claim for a declaratory order that the Public 
Protector abused her office during the investigation that produced the final report in question. 
He justified his conclusion by insisting that, however imperfect, the Public Protector’s attempts 
to investigate SARB and recover the money in the Bankorp/Absa matter cannot amount to 
abuse of office.26 
 
That said, the Chief Justice’s position on SARB’s independence from the state sharply contrasts 
with the ‘new consensus’ in macroeconomics and established practice in most developing 
nations. Central banks are often the institutions who import CBI from the global sphere to the 
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local sphere, demanding its adoption as mandatory.27 They use neoliberal globalization and 
scientific models as key political resources to push back contending actors, usually other state-
owned agencies,28 like SARB tried to resist the Public Protector’s efforts to investigate the 
Bankorp/Absa deal. 
 
CBI also represents the archetype of the doctrine for depoliticizing economic policy in that it 
intends to transfer policy-making from politicians to the closed circle of notionally apolitical 
experts.29 The South African Constitution entrenches CBI in section 224(2), where it lays down 
that, in pursuing its primary object, the SARB must “perform its functions independently and 
without fear, favour or prejudice” (emphasis added). In PP v SARB, the SARB contended that 
the President of the Republic would have no role to play if Parliament moved to amend or 
reconfigure the SARB’s mandate – a contention that Chief Justice Mogoeng rejected in his 
dissenting opinion. The SARB’s contention embodies the CBI doctrine. 
 
Independence as vulnerability 
SARB feared that the Public Protector failed to explain her meetings with the Presidency and 
the State Security Agency because she was biased against it.30 The record contained 
handwritten notes which show that, on 3 May 2017, the Public Protector discussed the 
‘vulnerability’ of SARB with the State Security Agency. 
 
SARB did not also seem to understand what the whole notion of ‘vulnerability’ means. When 
referring to that notion of vulnerability, SARB expressly wondered ‘vulnerability to whom?’31 
The central bank became concerned that the Public Protector sought to undermine it.32 
However, in a reply that the majority of the court found “unintelligible”,33 the Public Protector 
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It is a pity that the parties did not have the opportunity to ventilate at length the question of 
central-bank independence. Mogoeng CJ’s dissenting judgment did offer some food for 
thought, but the Chief Justice did not go deep enough to provide clear guidance for future 
policy makers on how to deal with this burning CBI issue. 
 
On the other hand, the question for lawyers is whether the judiciary should get involved, given 
that they seem to lack the expertise and the resources to delineate the proper level of 
independence of a central bank, let alone the incredibly difficult task of setting monetary 
policies. Or so the neoliberal orthodoxy would have us believe, the idea being that policy 
making in the area of monetary policies should remain confined to a select group of technocrats 
and insulated from the vagaries of the politicians’ calculations.  
 
In any event, this case should become a classic in finance, finance law, and central banking. It 
sets the principle that people must refrain from “cloth[ing]” the central bank “with the mystified 
but real and highly undesirable mantle of untouchability or impunity.”35 At the same time, 
Mogoeng CJ acknowledged that the Public Protector “got the law completely wrong when 
acting as if it was open to her to direct Parliament to amend the Constitution and even in a 
specific way.”36 Though she, like any other citizen, can make suggestions to Parliament, she 
cannot take remedial action to direct Parliament to amend the Constitution.37 
 
The majority court held that SARB has the right to know why the Public Protector discussed 
its vulnerability with the security arm of the state. Is it a coincidence that both Public Protector 
Ms Mkhwebane38 and then-President Jacob Zuma39 notoriously worked as former spies? This 
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37 See ibid [64]. 
38 Sinikiwe Mqadi, ‘New Public Protector Candidate Busisiwe Mkhwebane Is Zuma’s Spy Says DA’ CapeTalk 
(6 September 2016)(reporting that some opposition members objected to Mkhwebane’s former experience as an 
‘analyst’ for the State Security Agency) <http://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/16391/new-public-protector-
candidate-busisiwe-mkhwebane-is-zuma-s-spy-says-da> accessed 28 December 2020; News24 and 
amaBhungane, ‘How the State Security Agency “Instructed” Busisiwe Mkhwebane to Make Reserve Bank, Absa 
Findings’ News24 (15 December 2019) <https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/state-capture-20-
part-1-spies-instructed-public-protector-on-sarb-report-20191215> accessed 28 December 2020. 
39 In the late 1980s, Jacob Zuma headed the intelligence department of the African National Congress (ANC), 
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case leaves many such questions unanswered. For example, given that the ruling party enjoys 
a majority in Parliament, the government could have simply passed a law to amend section 224 
of the Constitution instead of working with the Public Protector to achieve the same result, 
albeit obliquely. 
The Constitutional Court sighed that, in the absence of explanation from the Public Protector 
as to why she convened those meetings with security arm of the state, the court could not 
speculate on the reasons for those discussions with the President and the intelligence services.40 
Maybe some things are best kept secret. 
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